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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JAYNE I. PATIENCE, : Case No. 960399-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment of 
conviction entered on December 8, 1995. A copy of the Judgment 
is in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. Did plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel occur where the trial judge failed to sentence Appellant 
pursuant to the reduced penalty in effect at the time of her 
sentencing and, instead, sentenced Appellant to the greater 
penalty which was in effect for this crime at the time the 
Information was filed? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue involves a question of 
law. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1996). 
PRESERVATION. This issue was not raised in the trial 
court. This Court can review this issue under a plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. See State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Arauelles. 921 P.2d 
439, 440-41 (Utah 1996). Additionally, Pursuant to Rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review this 
illegal sentence. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859-60 (Utah 
1995) . 
ISSUE II. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
imposing consecutive sentences based on its determination that 
Appellant had committed an additional embezzlement where the 
other matter involved a civil dispute and was never charged 
criminally? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION. Defense counsel informed the judge that 
the otfrer dispute was resolved civilly. R. 105. Additionally, 
this i^sue is reviewable under a plain error analysis. See Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1208. 
ISSUE III. Did plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel occur where Patience was convicted of three counts of 
Attempted Forgery instead of one count based on a series of 
transactions which were part of one plan and based on one general 
intent to embezzle? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. This issue involves a question of 
law. See Pena. 869 P.2d at 936. 
PRESERVATION. This issue was not raised in the trial 
court £>ut is reviewable under a plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel analysis. See DuOS/ 850 P.2d at 1208; 
State v. Crosby, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 41 (Utah 1996) . 
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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional 
provisions is in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996); 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 20, 1996, the State filed an Information 
charging Defendant/Appellant Jayne I. Patience ("Appellant" or 
"Patience") with three counts of Forgery, a second degree felony. 
R. 5-7. On October 20, 1995, Patience pled guilty to three 
counts of Attempted Forgery, a third degree felony. R. 5-7, 
28-29, 31-37. Copies of the plea Affidavit and Amended 
Information are in Addendum C. On December 8, 1995, the trial 
court sentenced Patience to serve three zero-to-five-year 
sentences consecutively at the Utah State Prison. R. 3 9-41. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 5, 1995, a change in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
took effect. Pursuant to that change, the penalty for a forgery 
involving a check with a face amount of $100 or more decreased 
from a second to a third degree felony. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (1995) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996) . 
Despite the change, the trial judge in this case sentenced 
Patience based on the penalty in effect at the time she was 
charged rather than the lesser penalty which was in effect at the 
3 
time Patience was sentenced. R. 39-41. 
At the sentencing hearing held on December 8, 1995, 
Patience's former employer, Virginius Dabney, appeared and spoke 
strongly in favor of incarceration. R. 102-105. The transcript 
of Dabney's sentencing statement is in Addendum D. Dabney was 
not placed under oath and he was not cross-examined. 
Dabney claimed that Patience had embezzled $18,000 from 
him when she worked for him as a legal secretary. R. 104. 
Dabney also discussed Patience's prior misdemeanor conviction, 
claiming that Patience had embezzled from a prior employer and, 
even though Dabney had helped her at sentencing, Patience had 
then embezzled from him. R. 104-05. 
Dabney stated in part: 
. . . within two or three months after I went to 
that extent [spoke on Patience's behalf at 
sentencing], Jane started to embezzle from me. 
She embezzled $18,000 in a period of ten months. 
She has worked for three different employers. 
She has embezzled from all of us. 
R. 104-05. 
Defense counsel argued that the dispute between Dabney 
and Patience was resolved civilly. R. 105. He stated: 
Mr. Dabney has made an impassioned plea, but 
I would simply remind the court this entire 
dispute with Miss Patience was resolved as a 
civil dispute. He sued her. He obtained a 
judgment against her. He settled with her for an 
amount less than the judgment, and called that a 
satisfaction, and he received less than what he 
obtained in the judgment, but he did accept it as 
payment in full, and it was a civil matter, and 
not a criminal matter. 
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R. 105. Nevertheless, the judge relied on the civil dispute 
between Patience and Dabney as the reason for imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
The victims have been stacked up back to 
back. It is unlikely that more than a few days 
lapsed from victim A to victim B to victim C. 
And the Court is of the opinion that the theft 
was continuous, it was on-going, and but for the 
fact that the defendant was caught on this case, 
three more employers would have resulted in three 
more victims. 
R. 107. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred in sentencing Patience to serve 
three consecutive zero-to-five-year sentences for three counts of 
Attempted Forgery. Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor, 
not a third degree felony, at the time of Patience's sentencing. 
Pursuant to established case law which has been in effect in Utah 
for twenty-five years and was recently followed by this Court in 
State v. Yates. 918 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1996), Appellant was 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty where such penalty 
was in effect at the time of her sentencing. The imposition of 
the incorrect sentence was plain error since it was obvious under 
existing law and prejudiced Patience by sentencing her too 
severely. The sentence was illegal and can be reviewed by this 
Court on appeal pursuant to Rule 22 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 859-60. 
Additionally, Patience received ineffective assistance of counsel 
where her attorney failed to argue that imposition of class A 
misdemeanor sentences was required. 
5 
The trial judge erred in imposing consecutive sentences 
based on his determination that Patience had committed three 
continuous crimes of embezzlement. Statements by Patience's 
former employer during sentencing which were not under oath or 
subject to cross-examination and which were related to a civil 
dispute the employer had with Patience did not establish that 
Patience had committed the crime of embezzlement against that 
employer. 
Utah case law requires that a defendant be convicted of 
only one count where "the evidence discloses one general intent" 
and "one plan, even though there is a series of transactions." 
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980); State v. Crosby, 
3 02 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38. In this case, the evidence disclosed 
one general intent and plan. Indeed, the prosecutor, defense 
counsel, victim, and judge all considered this an ongoing crime. 
The error was obvious under case law in effect at the time 
Patience was charged. Defense counsel performed deficiently in 
failing to bring this issue to the court's attention. The error 
was harmful in that Patience was convicted of three counts rather 
than one. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHERE THE 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SENTENCE PATIENCE PURSUANT 
TO THE LESSER PENALTY IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF 
HER SENTENCING. 
6 
A. ATTEMPTED FORGERY WAS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR 
AT THE TIME PATIENCE WAS SENTENCED; PATIENCE IS 
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THIS LESSER PENALTY. 
The Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
effective May 1, 1995. The amendment changed the classification 
for a forgery involving a check with a face amount of $100 or 
more from a second to a third degree felony. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 
1996). The version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996) 
which went into effect on May 1, 1995 states: 
76-6-501. Forgery--"Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that 
he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by 
anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another 
without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, 
issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in 
fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" 
includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording 
valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, 
credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or 
any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instruments or 
7 
writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person 
or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third 
degree. 
The previous version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995) 
which was in effect when Patience was charged states in relevant 
part: 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(b) a check with a face amount of 
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or 
writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person 
or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree 
if the writing is or purports to be a check with 
a face amount of less than $100; all other 
forgery is a class A misdemeanor. 
Patience pled guilty to three counts of attempting to 
alter the check of another with a face value of $100 or more. 
R. 31-33. At the time Patience entered her plea as well as at 
the time of sentencing, forgery was a third degree felony, 
regardless of the face value of the check. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501 (Supp. 1996). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
102(4) (1995), an attempt to commit a third degree felony is a 
class A misdemeanor. Therefore, at the time Patience was 
sentenced, Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor. 
Case law in effect in Utah at the time Patience was 
sentenced mandated that the trial judge sentence her for the 
lesser class A misdemeanor which applied to her crime at the time 
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of sentencing. S^e Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971); 
State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971); Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 
P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1976); State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340, 1342 
(Utah 1974); see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 138. 
The Belt Court relied on the rationale in People v. 
Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956): 
This application of statutes reducing punishment 
accords with the best modern theories concerning 
the functions of punishment in criminal law. 
According to these theories, the punishment or 
treatment of criminal offenders is directed 
toward one or more of three ends: (1) to 
discourage and act as a deterrent upon future 
criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so 
that he may not harm society and (3) to correct 
and rehabilitate the offender. There is no place 
in the scheme for punishment for its own sake, 
the product simply of vengeance or retribution, 
[citations omitted]. A legislative mitigation of 
the penalty for a particular crime represents a 
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or 
the different treatment is sufficient to meet the 
legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is 
to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty 
after such a pronouncement; the excess in 
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose 
other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance. As 
to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to 
assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the 
legislative design that the lighter penalty 
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently 
reach the courts. 
Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.Ed.2d at 201-02). 
In cases where an amendment reducing the criminal penalty 
becomes effective prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court has 
"consistently held that in such situations, xthe law in force at 
the time of sentencing govern[s] . . . .'" Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990) (quoting Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343, 
344 (Utah 1975)) (emphasis in original). See also Saxton, 519 
9 
P.2d at 1342 (defendant is entitled to lesser punishment if 
penalty for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence). 
The rationale for this rule was set forth in Tapp, 4 90 
P.2d at 336: 
[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature, 
expressing the will of the people, to fix the 
penalties for crimes and the courts should give 
effect to the enactment and the effective date 
thereof as so declared . . . [T]o insist on the 
prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to 
accept and keep abreast of the process which has 
been continuing over the years of ameliorating 
and modifying the treatment of antisocial 
behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance 
and punishment to treatment and rehabilitation. 
In the same tenor are the time-honored rules of 
the criminal law generally favorable to one 
accused of a crime: that in case of doubt or 
uncertainty as to the degree of crime, he is 
entitled to the lesser; and correlated thereto: 
that as to an alternative between a severe or a 
lenient punishment, he is entitled to the latter. 
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. 
In Yates, 918 P.2d at 138-139, this Court recently 
applied the rule that "defendants are entitled to the benefit of 
the lesser penalty afforded by an amended statute made effective 
prior to their sentencing." Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 8. This Court 
acknowledged that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court articulated this 
principle twenty-five years ago," and additionally, that Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) (1995) suggests that a defendant is 
entitled to the lesser penalty in effect at the time of 
sentencing. In Yates, this Court held that Yates was entitled to 
the benefit of the change in penalty for theft crimes which went 
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into effect May 1, 1995.x 
The State argued that Yates should not benefit from the 
Belt rule because: (1) the actual value of the property stolen 
rather than the amount to which Yates pled guilty should control 
the classification of the crime, and (2) Yates was responsible 
for the delay in sentencing. Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9-140. This 
Court rejected both arguments, determining (1) the "facts" listed 
in the amended charging documents control the nature of the 
conviction, and (2) the Belt rule requires that a defendant be 
sentenced pursuant to the lesser penalty in effect at the time of 
sentencing regardless of whether a "defendant's misconduct delays 
sentencing beyond the amended statute's effective date." Id.2 
In the present case, the Amended Information, plea 
affidavit and Judgment all indicate that Patience pled guilty to 
and was convicted of three counts of Attempted Forgery. R. 5-6, 
31-5, 3 9-41; see Addendum D; see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9. At 
the time of Patience's sentencing on December 8, 1995, Forgery 
was a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 
1996); see Addendum A. An attempt to commit a third degree 
felony was a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 
(1995). Attempted Forgery, therefore, was a class A misdemeanor 
1
 The statutory change at issue in Yates was made as part of 
the same legislative package as the statutory changes at issue in 
Yates. See discussion of legislative history regarding decision to 
lower classification for these offenses in Yates, 918 P.2d at 139. 
2
 Neither of the infirmities claimed by the State and 
rejected by this Court in Yates exist in this case. Patience did 
not cause a delay in sentencing, and Forgery is a third degree 
felony regardless of the amount involved. 
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when Patience was sentenced. The trial judge erred in sentencing 
Patience to three third degree felonies based on her convictions 
for Attempted Forgery. 
B. FAILURE TO SENTENCE PATIENCE FOR CLASS A 
MISDEMEANORS CONSTITUTED AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE, 
PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
Defense counsel did not object to the imposition of the 
illegal third degree felony sentences. This error nevertheless 
requires reversal under each of the following analyses: 
(1) plain error, (2) the court's ability to correct an illegal 
sentence, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. 
"In order to demonstrate plain error, defendant must show 
(1) error, (2) that the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and (3) that the error was harmful." State v. 
Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 29 (Utah 1996) (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208; State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996). 
As set forth supra at 7-12, error occurred in this case 
where the trial judge sentenced Patience for three third degree 
felonies where Attempted Forgery was a class A misdemeanor at the 
time of Patience's sentencing. See Yates, 918 P.2d at 138. This 
error should have been obvious to the trial judge since the 
statutory penalty had been amended and the principle that 
defendants be given the benefit of the amended lesser penalty was 
announced by the Supreme Court twenty-five years ago in Belt v. 
Turner, 479 P.2d at 792-93, and has been repeatedly followed. 
Yates, 918 P.2d at 138. Indeed, as this Court stated in Yates: 
12 
Utah law on this question is clear and the 
instant case does not present an exception to the 
well-established rule: Defendants are entitled 
to lesser criminal punishments mandated by 
statutes that become effective before the court 
imposes sentence. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93. 
After the legislature reduces criminal penalties, 
courts must impose sentences accordingly. 
Yates, 918 P.2d at 13 9 (emphasis added). The error was 
prejudicial in that Patience was sentenced to prison to serve 
consecutively three sentences of zero to five years instead of 
being sentenced to serve three maximum one-year sentences. 
In addition to being plain error, this sentence is 
illegal and can be reviewed by this Court pursuant to Rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 
859-60. Since Patience is attacking the sentence itself, this 
Court may review this issue for the first time on appeal pursuant 
to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.; State v. 
Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, this issue can also be reviewed under a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Sixth 
Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides an accused the right to effective assistance 
of counsel. Arcruelles, 921 P.2d at 440. 
"To prevail [on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel], a defendant must show, 
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." 
Arcruelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 
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516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, U.S. , 11 S. Ct. 431, 130 
L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) (quoting Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988)))
 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984) . 
Patience received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
this case where (1) counsel performed deficiently by failing to 
argue that Patience should have been sentenced for three class A 
misdemeanors rather than three third degree felonies, and 
(2) Patience was prejudiced by the deficient performance in that 
she was sentenced more harshly than was permissible. As set 
forth supra at 7-12, the principle that a defendant is to be 
sentenced pursuant to a lesser penalty which is in effect at the 
time of sentencing was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court 
twenty-five years ago and followed in subsequent decisions. See 
Belt, 479 P.2d at 792-93; see also Yates, 918 P.2d at 138. 
Although "Utah law on this question [was] clear," defense counsel 
failed to argue that Patience should receive the benefit of the 
lesser penalty in effect at the time of her sentencing. See 
Yates, 918 P.2d at 139. By failing to argue existing case law 
and statutory provisions which would benefit Patience, counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1990) . 
This Court will review claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel which are raised for the first time on appeal only 
where the record is sufficient to allow the appellate court to 
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review the issue without remand of findings by the trial court. 
See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993). No evidence or 
argument exists which would justify not arguing that Patience be 
sentenced to the lesser penalty. See Humphries, 818 P.2d at 
1029. "No sound course of trial strategy could dictate defense 
counsel to be silent at such a critical time." Humphries, 818 
P.2d at 103 0. Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
Patience since she was improperly sentenced to prison to serve 
three zero-to-five-year sentences rather than being correctly 
sentenced to serve three one-year sentences. 
POINT II. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A 
FAIR SENTENCING HEARING WAS VIOLATED WHERE THE 
TRIAL JUDGE BASED HIS DECISION TO IMPOSE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON A CIVIL DISPUTE BETWEEN 
APPELLANT AND A FORMER EMPLOYER. 
Due process under the state and federal constitutions 
applies to sentencing and "requires that a sentencing judge act 
on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising 
discretion in fixing a sentence." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), citing inter alia State v. Howell, 707 
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). Various other cases recognize the 
need for accurate and reliable information in sentencing. See, 
e.g., State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) 
("Lipskv I"); Howell, 707 P.2d at 118; Townsend v. Burke. 334 
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed.2d 1690 (1948). 
In Townsend v. Burke, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the defendant's right to due process was violated where 
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the sentencing judge relied on three charges which had been 
dismissed or for which the defendant had been found not guilty. 
The court reasoned that had the defendant been represented by 
counsel, counsel would have informed the court that the three 
charges did not result in convictions. Accordingly, 
it is the careless or designed pronouncement of 
sentence on a foundation so extensively and 
materially false, which the prison had no 
opportunity to correct by services which counsel 
would provide, that renders the proceedings 
lacking in due process. 
Id. at 1255. 
The Utah Supreme Court emphasized in State v. Johnson, 
856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993), that sentencing must be based on 
reliable information in order to meet due process guarantees. 
Johnson claimed that his right to due process was violated where 
the trial court admitted "unproven allegations that there was 
another victim" and placed the burden on him to refute the 
allegations which were based on double and triple hearsay. In 
holding that the defendant's right to due process was violated at 
sentencing, the Court reasoned that "a sentence cannot be 
predicated on false information" or on information with little 
probable accuracy. 
In Howell, the Utah Supreme Court held that due process 
rights of the defendants were not violated where the trial judge 
considered evidence that the defendants' "children had been 
[sexually] abused if not by [the defendants], then by someone 
else" in determining sentence based on convictions for reckless 
physical abuse of the children. Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. The 
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Supreme Court reasoned that the damage caused by the sexual abuse 
was visible and the parents "should have been aware of these 
circumstances had they been acting with reasonable care toward 
their children." Id. It reasoned further that the parents 
"either knew of the sexual abuse . . . or were 'putting their 
heads in the sand' to avoid finding out about it," and that 
"[e]ither of these alternatives constitutes a form of physical 
and sexual abuse." Id. at 118. Accordingly, the Court held that 
the defendants' right to due process was not violated at 
sentencing. 
The Howell court emphasized, however, that 
The due process clause of Article I, section 7 of 
the Utah constitution, requires that a sentencing 
judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence. 
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. 
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988), 
discussed the use of unproven crimes in the penalty phase of a 
capital homicide trial. The court held that "the sentencing 
body--be it judge or jury--may not rely on other violent criminal 
activity unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused did commit the other crime." Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1260. Reliance on unproven conduct could violate due process 
and result in prejudice to a defendant where a sentencer imposes 
death even though the conduct has not been proved. Similar 
concerns apply in the noncapital context. A defendant who is 
punished based on unproven conduct suffers unfair prejudice and a 
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violation of due process. See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19 
(Minn. 1982) (error for trial judge to rely on charge which was 
dismissed as part of plea bargain); People v. Harvey, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 696 (Cal. 1979); People v. Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 
1960) . 
Although Utah case law has not directly addressed the 
issue of whether a defendant's right to due process is violated 
where the sentencing judge considers a civil judgment as evidence 
of criminal activity and relies on that conduct as a basis for 
sentencing, in the noncapital context, the lack of reliability of 
the evidence presented in this case, as well as the lack of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Patience committed the crime of 
embezzlement against Dabney, demonstrates that Patience's right 
to due process was violated in this case where the judge relied 
on Dabney's statement as a basis for determining that Patience 
perpetrated a third embezzlement.3 
3
 In State v. Harris, 861 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1993) 
(withdrawn from publication), Appellant claimed that his right to 
due process was violated where the trial judge sentenced him based 
on allegations which were not included in his guilty plea. The 
State originally confessed error in that case, conceding that "in 
sentencing defendant, the trial court erred in considering the 
unproven charges which had been dismissed as the result of 
defendant's plea bargain with the State." Appellee's brief in Case 
No. 930034-CA at 3. This Court issued an opinion for publication 
in which it held that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
sentencing Appellant based on the dismissed charges. Thereafter, 
the State petitioned for rehearing, claiming that it had improperly 
confessed error and that controlling case law allowed the trial 
court to consider the dismissed charges. This Court withdrew its 
decision in Harris from publication but let the decision itself 
stand. Hence, this Court has previously determined in an 
unpublished opinion that a trial court abused its discretion by 
relying on an incident which did not result in a conviction as a 
basis for sentencing. 
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Dabney made his statement without first being placed 
under oath. R. 102. Defense counsel was not given the 
opportunity to cross-examine Dabney. R. 105. Dabney indicated 
that Patience had embezzled $18,000 from him and argued for 
incarceration, claiming that she embezzled from three employers. 
R. 103-105. The trial judge was swayed by Dabney's statement and 
argument, concluding that consecutive sentences at the prison 
were appropriate because Patience had embezzled from three 
employers. R. 106-07. Indeed, the trial judge speculated that 
"it is unlikely that more than a few days lapsed from victim A to 
victim B to victim C" and considered the theft continuous and 
ongoing. R. 106-07.4 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 discusses the impositions of 
concurrent or consecutive sentences. It states in pertinent part: 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences--
Limitations. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether ii impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences 
for state offenses shall run concurrently unless 
the court states in the sentence that they shall 
run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences 
for offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
Effective May 1, 1995, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 was 
amended to create a presumption for consecutive sentences where the 
defendant was imprisoned or on parole when s/he committed the 
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (Supp. 1996). Patience was 
not imprisoned or on parole when this crime was committed, so 
concurrent sentences were favored regardless of which version of 
§ 76-3-401 controls in this case. 
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Under these circumstances where the trial judge relied on 
a statement by a witness not under oath or subject to cross-
examination regarding a civil matter as the basis for concluding 
that Patience had committed an additional crime and sentenced 
Patience based on that civil matter, Patience's right to due 
process was violated. The trial judge abused his discretion in 
relying on Dabney's civil claims as the basis for imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
POINT III. PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OCCURRED IN THIS CASE WHERE 
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF THREE COUNTS OF 
ATTEMPTED FORGERY INSTEAD OF ONE COUNT. 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel also 
occurred in this case where Patience was convicted of three 
counts of Attempted Forgery based on forgeries of three checks 
which occurred as part of "an embezzlement over a period of 
time." State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980). In 
Kimbel, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . [T]he general test as to whether there are 
separate offenses or one offense is whether the 
evidence discloses one general intent or 
discloses separate and distinct intents. The 
particular facts and circumstances of each case 
determine this question. If there is but one 
intention, one general impulse, and one plan, 
even though there is a series of transactions, 
there is but one offense . . . . 
Id. at 518 (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1950)). The Kimbel court stated: "This Court has held that 
embezzlements over a period of time may be found to constitute 
one continuous transaction." Kimbel. 620 P.2d at 518. 
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The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle 
in Crosby, 3 02 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38. In Crosby, the State 
charged three counts of theft, alleging that "between November of 
1991 and June of 1992, Crosby misappropriated company funds for 
her personal use." Id. at 36. Crosby argued on appeal that 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel occurred where 
she was convicted of three counts of theft rather than one count. 
Id. at 40. The Court pointed out that "[t]he evidence in this 
case demonstrates that although the transactions underlying 
Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they 
were part of a single plan and should have been charged as a 
single offense." Id. Although the various transactions in 
Crosby "were separated into different counts to distinguish the 
different methods Crosby used to allegedly avert cash for her 
personal use," the jury instructions "made no distinction between 
the three counts." Relying on Kimbel and State v. Patterson, 700 
P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985), and the facts of the case, the Court held 
that plain error occurred in sentencing Crosby to more than one 
count of second degree felony theft. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-4 02 provides: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any 
such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
21 
"Section 76-1-402 supports [the holding in Crosby]" (Crosby, 302 
Utah Adv. Rep. 40) as well as Patience's position. 
Although the State charged this crime as three counts of 
Forgery rather than Theft, both the State and defense referred to 
the crime as an ongoing embezzlement from Patience's employer. 
R. 94, 96. The prosecutor stated: "this is not just an isolated 
incident of taking money on the basis of one opportunity, because 
you are in dire straits, but repeatedly, time and again, taking a 
hugh amount of money." R. 97. The attorney for the Copy Man 
also discussed Patience's actions as if there were one general 
plan and intent. R. 100. In addition, the plea agreement 
evidences a general intent and single plan to alter checks for 
her own benefit. In sentencing Patience, the judge referred to 
Patience's crime as a "continuous, ongoing" theft. R. 107. 
Under these circumstances, "the evidence discloses one general 
intent" and "one plan, even though there is a series of 
transactions." See Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518. Pursuant to Kimbel 
and Crosby, the trial judge erred in convicting Patience of three 
counts. 
As was the case in Crosby, this error was plain and based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel. The error was obvious 
pursuant to "clear Utah case law on this issue" (Crosby, 3 02 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 41) issued prior to Patience's sentencing. See 
Crosby, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41; Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 517-18. 
Additionally, given the "clear Utah case law on this issue" (Id. 
at 41), defense counsel performed deficiently in failing "to 
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bring the matter promptly to the court's attention and to cite 
applicable law." Id. at 41; see also Id. at 39 (setting out test 
for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). The error was 
harmful in that it resulted in three convictions for Attempted 
Forgery instead of one. Id. 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
occurred in this case where Patience was convicted of three 
counts rather than one count of Attempted Forgery. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Jayne Patience respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the Judgment and remand her case for 
resentencing. 
SUBMITTED this &0H, day of December, 1996. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-Included 
offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court 
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
As last amended by Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1974. 
UTAH CODE 
§ 76-4-102. Attempt-Classification of offenses 
Criminal attempt to commit: 
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony; 
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; except that an attempt to 
commit child kidnaping, in violation of Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those 
felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, which are first degree felonies, is a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than three years and which may be for life; 
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; 
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; 
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the 
penalty for a class C misdemeanor. 
Amended by Laws 1983, c. 88; Laws 1996, c. 40, s 3, eff. April 29, 1996. 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 
1073, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 19; 
1975, ch. 52, § 1. 
UTAH CODE 
§ 76-6-501. Forgery~"Writing" defined 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, 
or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including forms 
such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and 
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a 
government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
Amended by Laws 1975, c. 52; Laws 1995, c. 291, s 15, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1996, c. 205, s 27, eff. April 29, 1996. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection*] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL & ORDER 
CRIMINAL NO. 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
COMES NOW, CfrtuNl£ q:. 9prflEh\CB , the defendant in this case and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s): 




3 r * 
c. A-tn^v/fr€-y> Pr>gc«g^ 3 / * . 
j Scuo—' 
0 0 0 ( ? 3 * 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) against me, I have read it, and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: J, ^/-/fi^zo hrd "fa 
/ f s r fg fAlesTdk 4 \ P ^tr7"bVvj a-l ^vusr^cfr (ckeclc^ on 
4Vi a\AAMsy^ o£ $ /660J? oT IA<vof<P - . 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charges are as follows: IT - <5*/v Q/ ^ Af 5 ^ 
/ 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the court, 
to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. if (have nop (feSWTwaived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to 
0 0 0 n ? «> 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and understand 
the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^ and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, 
my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at State expense to testify in court upqn my 
behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do 
so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences 
will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury 
the verdict must be unanimous. 
0 0 0 0 3 3 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by 
a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford 
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to which I 
pleadrt guilty MmxcontQ3t>. I know that by plnrlingMniiltjjfnp rnntrit) tn an offense that 
carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a minimum 
mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a fine an eighty-five percent (85 %) 
surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may 
be ordered by the court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guiltyjA-ftcteontgat) J am waiving my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged 
and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) CM (gutity)^ jraecsB!e§B (is)-ffi **>t} the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, 
if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this affidavit. 
0 0 0 0 3 4 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) <fi (guiltyj (wr 
t) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation 
or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that 
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding 
on the court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty, and no promises except, those contained herein and in the attached plea 
agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
19. I am H y years of age; I have attended school through the [ 2 ^ grade and 
I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was 
not under the influence of any drags, medication or intoxicants which would impair my judgment 
when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entering my plea. 
0 0 0 0 3 5 
DATED this f)0^ day of &£.TZ>E>C&- , 1 9 ^ 5 " 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for O'fyf*)? 5 P/hrf^rfCeT the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her 
and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations 
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
5RNEY FORDEFENDANT/BARNUMBER 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the 
defendant and find that the declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge(s) and 
the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense are true 
and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been 
offered to defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the 
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) 
for which the plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
^ 'Co ^ X ^ ? 3 7Q 
G ATTORNEY/BAR NUMBER 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea of 
(guilty) (no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the defendant's plea 
of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this / Q Q day of f ) f*. /*>£** ^ 1 9 /"«> 
y .. r>.^ 
PAT B. BRIAN, 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E ^ ^ 
A A ft ft f* 7 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-




) Screened by: K. UPDEGROVE 
Assigned to: K. UPDEGROVE 
BAIL: $25,000.00. 
Case No. 
I N T O R M A T I Q N ^ , / ? - j£ 
The undersigned Detective Doug Townsend - SLCOSO, under oath states on information 
and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of: 
COUNTI 
FORGERY, a S ^ n d Degree Felony, at 3355 South Highland Drive, in Salt Lake County, State 
LjJ/ of Utah, on or about February 3, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I. 
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority or 
uttered any such altered writing; to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or 
more. 
H (> ft fi f* 
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COUNT II 
FpRGERY, a sjgf^ nd Degree Felony, at 1255 East Brickyard Road, in Salt Lake County, State 
'M of Utah, on or about February 21, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I. 
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority or 
uttered any such altered writing; to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or 
more. 
COUNT III 
FORQpRY, a jk(fond Degree Felony, at 1255 East Brickyard Road, in Salt Lake County, State 
pf Utah, on or about February 22, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
501(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JAYNE I. 
PATIENCE, a party to the offense, did alter a writing of another without his authority 
uttered any such altered writing, to-wit: a check having a face amount of $100.00 or 
more. 
TfflS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Doug Townsend, Ed Wertz, Robert Wertz, Troy Noall, Karen Nelson, L. Mackay, Amy 
Earl. 
OBABLE CAUSE ST 
Your affiant, a Salt Lake County Sheriffs Detective, is informed by agency report 95-
25246 and personal knowledge and states as follows: 
Amy Earl, a teller with First Security Bank, 1255 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake 
County, will testify that on February 3, 1995, and February 21, 1995, defendant Jayne I. Patience 
deposited checks drawn on the account of TCM, her employer. Both checks were in excess of 
U Vj u v-
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. JAYNE I. PATIENCE 
DAO No. 95003464 
Page 3 
Troy Noall, a teller with First Security Bank, 3355 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake 
County, will testify that on February 22, 1995, defendant deposited another TCM check into her 
account which was in excess of $100.00. 
Robert Wertz, of TCM, will testify that all three checks had been made payable to other 
than defendant and that the checks had been altered to make them payable to defendant 
personally or to a business with which she was connected. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney 
DETECTIVE DOUG TOWNSEND 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2J^ 
day of March, 1995. 
<M^ 
N1A<#STRAT£,:-./ ,. 
Deputy District Attorney 
March 20, 1995 
sbt/95003464 
<\ f o f> r* >*? 
ADDENDUM D 
much as we can for that. And because of our position, I told 
both the defendant and her attorney that we would remain 
neutral, and leave that up to the discretion of the Court. Her 
attorney has told us that she would agree that restitution in 
the amount of $485,000 plus interest and costs could be imposed 
in the criminal action, as well, if the Court deems that 
appropriate. And they have agreed that it would be 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
That's, basically, what I would like to present to 
the Court as our side, from the victim's standpoint. If the 
Court would like to see the settlement agreement and the 
judgment — 
THE COURT: You are invited to file a copy of it with 
the Court, and we will include it as a permanent part of the 
criminal file. 
Anyone else? 
MR. DABNEY: My name is Jinx Dabney. I am an 
attorney. I have practiced law probably for over 22 years, and 
my practice is, has basically been limited to workers 
compensation, Social Security cases. I deal with people all 
day long. I like that practice. I have made my living doing 
that, and I get a lot of enjoyment out of it. 
As part of that practice, I tend to trust people. I 
trust my clients when they tell me something. I trust my 
employees when they tell me something. People like Miss 
15 
Patience, who work for me, had a great deal of trust, from my 
standpoint. I had her doing things that, probably, I might 
even question whether I would want my wife to do them. She did 
an awful lot of good legal work for me. She was a good legal 
secretary, extremely bright, very capable, but she had one, 
little thing in her, I guess, that went wrong. 
I would like to relate one story that I think causes 
me to recommend, as I have, incarceration in this case. And 
that's this. She came to me about ten months before I let her 
go, which was before I knew what she had done and what she had 
stolen from us. She came to me and said, "I have a criminal 
problem. The judge is going to send me to prison if I don't 
come up with some money. And I need to do it very quickly." 
She asked me for the money. I declined. She then said, "I 
think I can get the money, but I need to have you go over and 
talk to Judge Rokich about that, because he is going to put me 
in jail. I haven't got the money in time," 
I suggested to her to borrow the money any way you 
can, and I will personally go over and speak to Judge Rokich 
about that. What we did is I went over with her attorney. We 
met with Judge Rokich in chambers. And I indicated to him that 
she was a very valuable employee, that I would trust her with 
anything in my office, that she was an excellent legal 
secretary, and that, if he were to put her in jail, this would 
create a significant impact on my practice, because, frankly, 
16 
she was one of the — at that time was the best legal secretary 
I had ever had in 20 years of legal practice. 
Judge Rokich, to his credit, agreed not to put her in 
jail, accepted the amount. And that was the first case of 
embezzlement that came to an end. 
I tell that story because, within two or three months 
after I went to that extent, Jane started to embezzle from me. 
She embezzled $18,000 in a period of about ten months. I let 
her go for reasons not related to that, and discovered it just 
by mistake, that it happened. That probably tells me, for one, 
more about the kind of person we are dealing with here than any 
other story I could tell you. She has worked for three 
different employers. She has embezzled from all of us. 
And even knowing that, once I had discovered that, I 
did not come over here and file a criminal case, or there would 
be two cases here before The Copy Man. And I didn't do it, 
your Honor, because she had a young daughter at home, and I 
just didn't have it in me to do it. I look back now, and I say 
to myself maybe I should have done that. Maybe she would have 
gotten the message. Maybe she wouldn't have stolen $485,000 
from The Copy Man. And I feel bad about that. I can't change 
that. I can simply say, your Honor, these are the facts. 
This woman has not learned. She is extremely bright. 
She has manipulated the system. She has embezzled from three 
different employers. I think society is entitled to have her 
17 
spend some time in prison, because I don't think there is 
anything else she is going to understand, but she will 
understand that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Anything further before sentence is imposed? 
MR. FLINT: May I have just one brief rebuttal? 
Mr. Dabney has made an impassioned plea, but I would simply 
remind the Court his entire dispute with Miss Patience was 
resolved as a civil dispute. He sued her. He obtained a 
judgment against her. He settled with her for an amount less 
than the judgment, and called that a satisfaction, and he 
received less than what he was seeking, and less than what he 
obtained in the judgment, but he did accept it as payment in 
full, and it was a civil matter, and not a criminal matter. 
With regard to Miss Patience, I would again simply 
implore the Court that what society needs are here, are to make 
sure that she doesn't do this again, to protect society from 
any type of misuse or abuse of trust by this particular 
defendant. That can be achieved as easily by an intensively 
supervised probation, by the wearing of an ankle bracelet, by 
reporting in on a daily basis, as well as it could be achieved 
by incarceration. 
Right now, there is no means whatsoever, if she is 
incarcerated for one year or less in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
and then placed on probation, there is no means for her to have 
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